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INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 OF 02 301402Z  
ACTION INR-10

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INFO OCT-01 ARA-16 SY-05 HA-06 PM-07 OCT-02 /047 W  
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R 301353Z JAN 81  
FM JCS WASHINGTON DC  
INFO CSA WASHINGTON DC  
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SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
CMC CC WASHINGTON DC  
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD  
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FM [REDACTED]  
TO DIA WASHINGTON DC

USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PN//SCJ2-IAD//  
DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-3E1//

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DIA FOR IR BRANCH

SUBJ: [REDACTED] (U)

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL

1. (U) CTRY: BRAZIL (BR)
2. (U) TITLE: MILITARY ASSUME LIMITED POLICE DUTIES IN RIO DE JANEIRO
3. (U) DATE OF INFO: 801200-810100
4. (U) ORIG: [REDACTED]
5. (U) REQ REFS: [REDACTED]
6. (U) SOURCE: OPEN SOURCE LOCAL PRESS

7. (U) SUMMARY: IN RESPONSE TO A DRAMATIC INCREASE OF CRIME IN RIO DE JANEIRO THE MILITARY HAS COME TO THE AID OF THE LOCAL POLICE AND IS DOING SOME LIMITED PATROLLING.

8A. (U) DETAILS: AN URBAN CRIME WAVE IN RIO DE JANEIRO IS BEYOND THE CONTROL OF THE REGULAR POLICE, THE POLICIA MILITAR, AND THE MILITARY HAS BEEN CALLED ON TO ASSIST THIS RECENT RASH OF ROBBERIES, KIDNAPPINGS AND KILLINGS HAS BEEN THE FOCAL POINT OF MEDIA ATTENTION WITH MOST NEWSPAPERS PROVIDING DAILY FRONT PAGE COVERAGE OF THE SITUATION, PUBLISHING EDITORIALS DEMEANING THE POLICE AND CALLING FOR PROTECTION FOR THE PUBLIC. A DESIRE BY THE CITIZENS TO HAVE THE MILITARY TAKE OVER POLICE DUTIES IN THE CITY WAS EXPRESSED IN THE NEWSPAPERS AND IN AN OBVIOUS EFFORT TO GET THE MILITARY INVOLVED THE NEWSPAPERS PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED STORIES OF CRIME AGAINST MILITARY PERSONNEL. A JOINT MILITARY AND CIVILIAN POLICE ACTION, THE REQUEST OF THE MAYOR, HAS BEEN ORGANIZED AND SELECTED MILITARY UNITS WILL PATROL AREAS OF THE CITY. THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT CIVILIANS WILL BE PLACED IN NORMALLY BUREAUCRATIC POSITIONS TO FREE MORE MILITARY FOR POLICE WORK.

8B. (U) ORIG COMMENTS: AN INCREASE OF CRIME IN RIO DE JANEIRO WAS EXPERIENCED LAST YEAR DURING THIS SAME TIME FRAME, CHRISTMAS-CARNIVAL, AND THE MILITARY WAS USED AT THAT TIME FOR STREET PATROL. DIFFERENCE THIS YEAR IS THE GREAT AMOUNT OF MEDIA ATTENTION BEING PAID TO THE SITUATION.

8C. (U) [REDACTED] A NUMBER OF BRAZILIAN MILITARY OFFICERS HAVE PREVIOUSLY STATED THEIR DESIRE FOR INCREASED PROTECTION OF THE CIVILIAN POPULACE WITH SOME GOING SO FAR AS TO URGE THE PRESENCE OF TROOPS ON THE STREETS. MOST HOWEVER, HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT TO GO SO FAR AS TO ABET INTERVENTION. THOSE WHO FAVOR AN INCREASED ROLE FOR THE MILITARY USUALLY ECHO THE CALL FOR ORDER AS AN ELEMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY (AND IT IS UNDER THIS AEGIS THE TROOPS ARE NOW ON THE STREETS). PERSONAL SECURITY IS ALSO A MATTER

OF CONCERN AND VIRTUALLY EVERY MILITARY OFFICER I KNOW CARRIES AT LEAST ONE SIDEARM WHEN VENTURING INTO THE CIVILIAN COMMUNITY. THERE ARE COGENT REASONS OFFERED IN REBUTTAL TO THE "TROOPS IN THE STREETS". ADVOCATES BY THEIR MILITARY PEERS. THE MAJORITY OF OFFICERS CONSIDER POLICING A CITY TO BE "NOT SOLDIERS WORK." THE USE OF TROOPS TO BREAK THE ROAD BLOCKS ERECTED IN THE SOUTH OF BRAZIL LAST MONTH BY ANGRY PIG FARMERS RAISED THE MILITARY HACKLES HERE IN RIO. AS ONE OFFICER NOTED TO ME, "THE TROUBLE WITH THIS KIND OF THING IS IT KEEPS GETTING EASIER TO CALL OUT THE TROOPS WHENEVER THERE IS A MINOR DISTURBANCE." SOME OF THE MORE FARSIGHTED SEE THE DISTINCT POSSIBILITY TROOP PRESENCE MIGHT NOT BE ENOUGH TO STEM THE CRIME WAVE. THIS COURSE WOULD BRING THE MILITARY IN FOR HEAVY CRITICISM AS THEY ARE NOW BEING BILLED AS THE "SAVIORS" BY THOSE NEWSPAPERS ADVOCATING THEIR USE. AS ONE RIO-BASED GENERAL NOTED RECENTLY, "WE AREN'T EQUIPPED OR TRAINED FOR THIS" ... "THE AVERAGE SOLDIER IS STILL IN HIS TEENS AND JUST ISN'T PREPARED FOR WHAT HE CAN ENCOUNTER ON THE STREETS." THOSE WHO VIEW THE USE OF TROOPS WITH SOME TREPIDATION ARE UNDOUBTEDLY TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE REDUCED STRENGTH OF THE MILITARY AT THIS PARTICULAR MOMENT. WITH THE RELEASE OF THE MAJORITY OF THE DRAFTEES OF LAST YEAR, MANY UNITS ARE RUNNING ONLY 25-30 PERCENT ASSIGNED STRENGTH SO MANPOWER ITSELF WOULD BE SOMEWHAT OF A LIMITING FACTOR. RESERVES COULD BE CALLED UP BUT THAT IS VERY UNLIKELY. A TWO-DAY, INFORMAL TESTING OF PUBLIC OPINION SHOWS VIRTUALLY ALL CITIZENS ARE GENERALLY IN FAVOR OF A VISIBLE TROOP PRESENCE; HOWEVER, SURPRISINGLY ENOUGH, ALMOST HALF POINT OUT THIS IS MERELY TREATING THE SYMPTOM RATHER THAN THE DISEASE. MOST INDICATE THE CRIME PROBLEM WILL REALLY ONLY BE CURED WHEN INFLATION, UNEMPLOYMENT AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT ARE SOLVED BY THE GOVERNMENT

8C. (U) [REDACTED] THE INCIDENCE OF STREET CRIME IN RIO DE JANEIRO, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT OTHER MAJOR CITIES, HAS REACHED THE POINT THAT VIRTUALLY EVERYONE KNOWS A VICTIM. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED IN THE PRESS -- THOUGH PERHAPS EXAGGERATED -- THAT MORE THAN TEN PER CENT OF THE RIO RESIDENTS HAVE BEEN VICTIMS OF CRIME AT SOME TIME DURING THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS. IT IS INTERESTING, IN LIGHT OF COMPLAINTS AND THE CRY FOR SOLUTION, THAT SUGGESTIONS FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE ARE BEING VOICED BY MANY WHO OTHERWISE CRITICIZE MILITARY ACTIVITY AND INFLUENCE IN THE SOCIETY, AND AT THE SAME TIME, THE RESTRAINT BEING SHOWN BY THE MILITARY NOT TO ASSUME A PUBLIC ROLE IN POLICING THE STREETS.

DURING A VISIT TO EMFA 800120, [REDACTED] WAS INFORMED BY RADM MANOEL THAT THE RELATIVELY INEFFECTIVE CONTROL OF CRIME BY MUNICIPAL POLICE STEMMED IN LARGE PART FROM THEIR SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT. HE STATED THAT THE MUNICIPAL POLICE ARE LARGELY FROM THE SAME ECONOMICALLY DEPRIVED BACKGROUND AS THE CRIMINALS AND IN MANY INSTANCES HAVE AN AFFINITY AND SYMPATHY FOR THEIR PLIGHT. MORE IMPORTANTLY, HE SAID, THE MUNICIPAL POLICE ARE SO POORLY PAID THAT THEY MUST LIVE IN THE POOR NEIGHBORHOODS AND EVEN THE "FAVELAS". AS A RESULT THEY KNOW MANY OF THE CRIMINALS, AND ASIDE FROM ANY SYMPATHY THAT MAY OR MAY NOT EXIST, THEY ARE POWERLESS TO ACT BECAUSE OF THE FEAR OF JEOPARDIZING THEIR SAFETY AND THAT OF THEIR FAMILIES. WHETHER THIS ASSESSMENT IS ACCURATE AND CONTRIBUTES TO THE IMPUNITY AFFORDED CRIMINALS IS NOT CERTAIN, BUT IT HAS BEEN VOICED AS A FACTOR BY SOCIAL WORKERS AND BISHOP ARNS OF SAO PAULO. THIS REPORT ADDS INFORMATION TO [REDACTED] THE STREET PATROLLING REFERRED TO IN PARA 8A ABOVE IS LIMITED TO A "SHOW OF THE UNIFORM", ALTHOUGH THE UNIFORMED SOLDIERS CERTAINLY MAY ACT AS AN INTIMIDATING FACTOR TO THE LOCAL CRIMINAL ELEMENT.

9. (U) PROJ NO: NONE

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By: Amanda Weimer Date:

05-07-2015

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 02 OF 02 301402Z

- 10. (U) COLL MGMT CODES: NA
  - 11. (U) SPEC INST: DIRECT-NO
  - 12. (U) PREP BY: [REDACTED]
  - 13. (U) APP BY: [REDACTED]
  - 14. (U) REQ EVAL: NO REL TO: NA
  - 15. (U) ENCL: NONE
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